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Abstract
This paper evaluates the e¤ects of policy interventions on sectoral
labour markets and the aggregate economy in a business cycle model
with search and matching frictions. We extend the canonical model
by including capital-skill complementarity in production, labour mar-
kets with skilled and unskilled workers and on-the-job-learning (OJL)
within and across skill types. We rst nd that, the model does a
good job at matching the cyclical properties of sectoral employment
and the wage-skill premium. We next nd that vacancy subsidies for
skilled and unskilled jobs lead to output multipliers which are greater
than unity with OJL and less than unity without OJL. In contrast,
the positive output e¤ects from cutting skilled and unskilled income
taxes are close to zero. Finally, we nd that the sectoral and aggre-
gate e¤ects of vacancy subsidies do not depend on whether they are
nanced via public debt or distorting taxes.
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1 Introduction
Equilibrium unemployment models with search and matching frictions have
been extensively used in macroeconomic analyses of unemployment (see e.g.
Shimer (2010) and Rogerson and Shimer (2011) for an analytical overview
of this research). Among other extensions, this literature has considered
the importance of both di¤erences in workers skills and the potential for
skill erosion due to unemployment (see e.g. Cahuc et al. (2006), Krause
and Lubik (2006 and 2010), Dolado et al. (2009), Hagedorn et al. (2010),
Doppelt (2014) and Laureys (2014)). In this paper, we contribute to this
literature by examining unemployment over the business cycle in an economy
with fragmented labour markets for University educated (or skilled) and non-
University educated (or unskilled) workers, when the production structure
is characterised by capital-skill complementarity and workersproductivity
decreases with unemployment.
Our interest in labour markets and unemployment for skilled versus un-
skilled workers is motivated by empirical evidence on the importance of the
di¤erences between these two labour markets, regarding both wage and em-
ployment rates. We summarise some key di¤erences using quarterly data for
the U.S. over the period of 1992-2011 for sectoral employment and 1979-2003
for wage inequality.1
First, the literature on the skill premium has demonstrated that there
are signicant di¤erences in the wages across the two sectors. In particular,
wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour has increased in recent
decades to its highest levels in a century (see e.g. Goldin and Katz (2008)
and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for a discussion of longer time series and
historical data). This is demonstrated in the subplot (1,1) of Figure 1, which
plots the skill premium, dened as the ratio of skilled to unskilled wage, using
the quarterly series from Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008).
Second, wage inequality varies in business cycle frequencies, although
less than output and is not strongly correlated with output (see also e.g.
Lindquist (2004) and Pourpourides (2011)). This is captured in subplot
(2,1) which shows HP-ltered output and the skill premium. In particular,
the relative to output volatility of the skill premium is 0:87 and its output
1The data sources for the skilled and unskilled wage data (1979-2003) are from the
dataset of Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008). Sectoral employment/unemployment data
(1992-2011) are from the Current Population Survey, Table A-4. We use data on the
employment status of the civilian population 25 years and over by educational attainment
(see www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab4.htm). Finally, per capita quarterly output
data (1979-2011) are from the U.S. NIPA.
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correlation is 0:086.
[Figure 1 here]
Third, employment di¤ers signicantly between the two sectors. For ex-
ample, the data in subplot (1,2), show that unemployment is twice as high for
unskilled compared with skilled workers.2 Moreover, as demonstrated in sub-
plot (2,2), unskilled employment is more volatile than skilled, although both
closely track cyclical output. In particular, the volatility of the HP-ltered
unskilled employment is 1:8 times higher than that of skilled workers, whereas
their output correlations are about 0:93.
The literature has documented further di¤erences between the skilled and
unskilled sectors. Cahuc et al. (2006) nd that skilled workers have higher
bargaining power, while Pissarides (1994), Acemoglu (2001) and Krause and
Lubik (2006 and 2010) suggest that the ow cost of posting a vacancy is
higher in goodjobs. Moreover, in business cycle frequencies, there is not
much movement between the skilled and unskilled sectors.
In light of the above, we build a business cycle model with search and
matching frictions that lead to sectoral unemployment. To capture the above
empirical observations, we rst assume that unskilled workers cannot become
skilled. Instead, skilled workers work in skilled jobs and, if unemployed,
search for employment in the skilled sector. Similarly, unskilled workers work
in unskilled jobs, and if unemployed, search for employment in the unskilled
sector. Second, we assume that the production structure allows for skill-
biased technical change and, in particular, is characterised by capital-skill
complementarity. This setup has been shown to explain key characteris-
tics of the skill premium in the data, both in terms of its evolution over
the past several decades (see e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992), Krusell et al.
(2000) and He (2012)) as well as over the business cycle (Lindquist (2004)
and Pourpourides (2011)). The search and matching mechanism for employ-
ment creation that we employ follows the benchmark Mortensen-Pissarides
framework with the wage being determined via Nash bargaining. Moreover,
our setup allows for di¤erentiation between the two labour markets, such as
di¤erences in relative bargaining power, job separation rates and job posting
costs to reect the empirical observations outlined above.
Motivated by theories of labour augmenting technical progress driven by
on-the-job learning (OJL), we allow skilled and unskilled workersproductiv-
ities to be positive functions of employment. Alternatively, since the sectoral
productivities are decreasing functions of unemployment, they can equiva-
lently capture skill erosion due to not working. We consider two possibilities
2Fallick and Fleischman (2004), Hagedorn et al. (2010), and Pilossoph (2012) also
document higher job separation rates for unskilled versus skilled workers.
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for OJL where both skill types learn from their own and the other skill type.
The rst follows the literature that proposes learning-by-doing (LBD) as
a property of the production technology at the aggregate level and generates
knowledge spillovers. It thus works as an external e¤ect for the individual
(see e.g. Romer (1986) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1994)). In this case
the workers labour productivity depends on average employment, so that
LBD is taken as given at the level of the workers. The second follows more
closely the literature on skill erosion that is due to unemployment (see e.g.
Laureys (2014) and Doppelt (2014)). In this instance we allow the workers
of each type to internalise the e¤ect of their own employment on their labour
productivity. However, we maintain the assumption that the employment of
the other worker type is taken as given.
The model is calibrated to match the steady-state of aggregate and sec-
toral labour market data in the U.S., following the calibration strategy in
Shimer (2010). We nd that the calibration does a good job at matching the
second moments in the sectoral labour market data. In particular, the model
predicts a volatility for unskilled employment that is about twice as big as
that of skilled employment. Moreover, it predicts a series for the skill pre-
mium whose volatility is less than output and its correlation with output is
around zero. Consistent with the results in Shimer, the model under predicts
quantitatively the volatility of employment, but the gap is not very big. In
particular, the model variants considered predict an employment volatility
which ranges from 69% to 81% of the volatility of employment in the data,
whereas in the canonical models, e.g. Shimer (2010), this ratio is typically
about 25%. Since the model with and without OJL gives a relatively similar
t to the data, we present results below for policy interventions using both
specications.
Our policy analysis evaluates the e¤ects of temporary interventions on
the sectoral labour markets and the aggregate economy. We consider vacancy
subsidies and taxes, since as is demonstrated in Monacelli et al. (2010), pure
scal spending e¤ects on output are trivial and even negative in search and
matching models. We nd scal multipliers on output from the subsides
to skilled and unskilled vacancies, which are greater than unity when OJL
is external and near unity when it is internal. These large multipliers are
determined by the crowding-in of private investment, which follows the in-
creases in employment and labour productivity. Without OJL, the labour
productivity channel is absent and causes the output multipliers to fall to
about 0.6. In contrast to the vacancy subsidies, the positive output e¤ects
from cutting skilled and unskilled income taxes are near zero, irrespective
of the presence, or model, of OJL. We nally nd that the e¤ects of the
two vacancy subsidies do not depend on whether debt or distorting taxes
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are used to nance them. This is particularly good news, and suggests that
this type of intervention may be useful under the debt restrictions that many
governments now face in the wake of the nancial crisis.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the
model structure. Section 3 presents the calibration and cyclical properties of
the model. Section 4 undertakes the scal multiplier analysis and Section 5
concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Capital-skill complementarity
There areN rms which operate in competitive product markets. To produce
a single output, rms use capital, which they lease from the household, and
skilled and unskilled workers. The production technology is characterised by
capital-skill complementarity (see e.g. Goldin and Katz (2008) for historical
evidence on the empirical relevance of this technology in the 20th century).
In particular, a representative rm produces output yft , using a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) specication following e.g. Krusell et al.
(2000):
yft = At



lf;ut

+ (1  )
h


kft

+ (1  )

lf;st
i 1
(1)
where At > 0 is the level of total factor productivity (TFP); ;  < 1 are the
parameters determining the factor elasticities, i.e. 1= (1  ) is the elasticity
of substitution between capital and unskilled labour and between skilled and
unskilled labour, whereas 1= (1  ) is the elasticity of substitution between
capital and skilled labour; and 0 < ;  < 1 are the factor share parameters.
In this specication, kft is the quantity of capital used by the rm, whereas
lf;st and l
f;u
t denote the quantities of skilled and unskilled labour respectively.
2.2 Skilled and unskilled workers
There is a representative household whose members include skilled or un-
skilled workers. The workers are distinct units and can o¤er either skilled or
unskilled services in the labour markets. They can nd a job within the skill
sector in which they belong or remain unemployed. In the latter case, they
search for a job for the next time period within their skill sector. In other
words, in business cycle frequencies workers cannot change their skill status.
This assumption is motivated by empirical evidence suggesting that over the
5
business cycle, the share of college educated or skilled population has low
volatility and is e¤ectively uncorrelated with output. In particular, using
the data in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we nd that the standard deviation
of the cyclical component of the skilled population share, relative to that of
output, is 0.29, while its correlation with output is -0.23.3 This implies that
skilled workers can either work in skilled jobs or remain unemployed (and
search for skilled jobs), whereas unskilled workers can either work in un-
skilled jobs or remain unemployed (and search for unskilled jobs). Following
the literature on search frictions and unemployment in macroeconomic DGE
models since Mertz (1995), we assume that the head of the household makes
all decisions on behalf of its members and provides complete consumption
insurance. In other words, all workers consume the same amount of goods,
irrespective of their labour market status, i.e. regardless of whether they are
employed in skilled or unskilled jobs or they are unemployed.
The numbers of skilled and unskilled members for the representative
household are denoted as N s and Nu, respectively. The total size of the
household is normalised to be N and is thus given as: N = N s + Nu. The
respective population shares of skilled and unskilled members within a house-
hold are dened as: ns = N s=N and nu = Nu=N . We assume that population
and its composition remain constant.
For each skill type of household members, i = s; u, the number of mem-
bers/workers can be further decomposed into employed and unemployed
members, such that:
N i = N i;et +N
i;s
t (2)
where i = s; u for skilled and unskilled labour; and N i;et is the number of
employed members and N i;st is the number of unemployed members, who are
searching for a job. By normalising by N i, we have:
1 = eit + s
i
t (3)
where eit  N
i;e
t
N i
is the employment rate and sit  N
i;s
t
N i
is the unemployment
rate or the share of workers searching for a job.
2.3 Search and matching
There are two labour markets, for skilled and unskilled workers respectively.
Each unemployed worker needs to search for a job in the skilled or unskilled
3This is obtained using annual data for the share of college educated population mea-
sured in e¢ ciency units, 1963-2008, from Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and GDP per capita
data from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). The cyclical compo-
nent of the series is obtained using the HP-lter with a smoothing parameter of 100.
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sector, given her skill level, and can be matched with a rm that posts vacan-
cies in that sector. As in the standard search-and-matching literature (see
e.g. Pissarides (1986) and Blanchard and Diamond (1989)), the matching
technology is represented by a Cobb-Douglas (CD) function for both skilled
and unskilled labour:
M it = 
i
 
Sit
i  
V it
1 i
(4)
where, M it is the aggregate new matches at t;
4 Sit = N
isit denotes the aggre-
gate number of unemployed searching in labour market i; V it = Nv
i
t denotes
the aggregate number of job vacancies created by rms in labour market
i; i > 0 represents the constant e¢ ciency of matching for labour type i;
0 < i < 1 denotes the elasticity of searches for labour type i. In addition,
we dene the vacancy-to-unemployed ratio, zit = V
i
t =S
i
t = v
i
t= (n
isit), as the
tightness of type i labour market. The smaller the ratio of zit, the tighter
the labour market and therefore the harder for unemployed workers to match
with job vacancies.
The probability at which aggregate job searches lead to a new job match
in type i labour market is given by:
pit =
M it
Sit
= i
 
Sit
i 1  
V it
1 i
= i
 
zit
1 i
(5)
and its inverse, 1=pit, measures the duration of type i search.
The probability at which a job vacancy can be matched with an unem-
ployed household member is calculated by:
qit =
M it
V it
= i
 
Sit
i  
V it
 i
= i
 
zit
 i
(6)
and its inverse, 1=qit, measures the duration of type i job vacancy.
2.4 Household
There is a representative household comprised of skilled and unskilled indi-
viduals whose head makes all decisions on behalf of its members by guaran-
teeing equal consumption to each of them, with the objective of maximising
household welfare.
4In what follows, we use upper case letters for aggregate quantities and lower case
letters for per capita quantities.
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2.4.1 Problem
The representative household maximises discounted lifetime utility, Ut:
Ut = Et
1X
t=0
tut (7)
where Et is the conditional expectations operator at period t; and 0 <  <
1 denotes the constant rate of time preference. The instantaneous utility
function of the household is given by (see e.g. Shimer (2010)):
ut = ln(ct)  nsest   nueut (8)
where  > 0 is the preference parameter that measures the disutility cost of
employment and ct is the households average (or per capita) private con-
sumption. As is common in the literature, the disutility cost captures the
reduction in the time available for home production when a member nds
employment. Hence, the specication in (8) assumes that all members con-
sume ct and that if a member is unemployed, her utility is given by ln(ct),
whereas if a member is employed, her utility is given by ln(ct)   i, so that
ut measures average utility for the household.
The budget constraint of the household is:
ct + it + bt+1 =

rt    kt (rt   )

kt + t+
+Rbtbt + (1   st)nswst estZst + (1  ut )nuwut eutZut (9)
where it is households average private investment; bt+1 is the value of gov-
ernment bonds bought at period t; rt is the gross return to physical capital;
 kt is the tax rate on capital income; 0 <  < 1 is the constant depreciation
rate of physical capital; kt is the average physical capital held by the house-
hold at the beginning of t; t is average dividends received from the rms;
Rbt =
 
1 + rbt

is the gross return to bonds;  it is the labour income tax; w
i
t is
the gross wage rate; and Zit represents labour augmenting technology driven
by OJL. This technology positively depends on the level of employment. Al-
ternatively, Zit can be interpreted as a decreasing function of unemployment
and captures skill erosion due to not working.5 We allow for both skill types
to learn on-the-job from their own and the other skill type.
We consider two possibilities for OJL. The rst follows the literature that
proposes learning-by-doing (LBD) as a property of the production technol-
ogy at the aggregate level. This setup generates knowledge spillovers at the
5See, for example, Davis and von Wachter (2011) and Pollack (2013) for the e¤ects of
unemployment on labour productivity and Laureys (2014) and Doppelt (2014) for search
and matching models with skill depreciation due to unemployment.
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aggregate level which work as an external e¤ect for the individual (see e.g.
Romer (1986) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1994)). In this case, we allow
the workers labour productivity to depend on average employment, so that
LBD (or, alternatively, skill erosion) is taken as given at the level of the
worker. This case is represented as follows:
Zst  Zs;xt = 
s (est)
s
(eut )
1 s (10)
Zut  Zu;xt = 
u (est)
u
(eut )
1 u (11)
where a bar over a variable refers to average quantities; 
i > 0 are learning
productivity parameters; and 0 <  i < 1, are the elasticities of OJL with
respect to skilled employment for skilled and unskilled workers.
We will proceed with the model solution below using (10) and (11). How-
ever, we will also present and discuss results using a second possibility for
the determination of Zit , following more closely the literature on skill erosion
that is due to unemployment (see e.g. Laureys (2014) and Doppelt (2014)).
This alternative assumes that workers internalise the e¤ect of employment
on their labour productivity. Hence, in this case we allow the worker of each
type to internalise the e¤ect of their own employment on their labour pro-
ductivity. However, we maintain the assumption that the employment of the
other worker type is taken as given:6
Zst  Zs;nt = 
s (est)
s
(eut )
1 s (12)
Zut  Zu;nt = 
u (est)
u
(eut )
1 u . (13)
The capital stock evolves according to:
kt+1 = (1  ) kt + ~Akt it (14)
The capital evolution equation allows for an exogenous process, ~Akt , capturing
an investment-specic technological (IT) change, which has been shown to
contribute to output uctuations (see e.g. Greenwood et al. (2000), as well
as the changes in the skill premium (see e.g. Krusell et al. (2000), Lindquist
(2004), and Pourpourides (2011)). The stochastic process for investment-
specic technology, ~Akt is:
eAkt+1 =  eAk1 Ak  eAktAk e"Akt+1 (15)
where eAk > 0; 0 < Ak < 1; and "Akt+1  iidN 0; (Ak)2.
6Note that in both specications examined, labour productivity is increasing and con-
cave with respect to employment and bounded between zero and 
i, where i = s; u.
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By using equation (14) and dening as Akt  1~Akt , we can rewrite the
budget constraint of household:
ct + A
k
t kt+1 + bt+1 = ertkt + t+
+Rbtbt + (1   st)nswst estZst + (1  ut )nuwut eutZut (16)
where ert = rt    kt (rt   ) + Akt (1  ), is the net return to physical capital
after depreciation and tax. Note that Akt  1~Akt measures the e¤ective price
of investment, since Akt units of investment are needed to create one unit of
capital in the next period.
Employment for type i = s; u worker evolves according to:
eit+1 = p
i
ts
i
t +
 
1  it

eit (17)
where 0 < it < 1 is the rate of job separation for type i labour. The
stochastic process for the job separation rate, it, is:
it+1 =
 
i
1 gi  itgi e"git+1 (18)
where i > 0; 0 < gi < 1; and "
gi
t+1  iidN
h
0;
 
ig
2i
.
The households optimization problem is to choose fct; kt+1; bt+1g1t=0 to
maximise (7) subject to the constraints (3) and (16) taking factor prices
fwst ; wut ; rt; rbtg1t=0; prots ftg1t=0; the evolution of employment feitg1t=0; the
exogenous variables

Akt ; 
i
t
	1
t=0
; policy variables

 kt ; 
s
t ; 
u
t
	1
t=0
and initial
conditions for k0; b0 as given.
2.4.2 First-order conditions (FOCs)
The recursive form of the households problem is:
V (kt; bt; e
s
t ; e
u
t ) = max
ct;kt+1;bt+1
f(ln ct   nsest   nueut )+
+EtV
 
kt+1; bt+1; e
s
t+1; e
u
t+1
g (19)
where V (:) is the value function. Replacing ct making use of the budget
constraint (16) gives:
V (kt; bt; e
s
t ; e
u
t ) = max
kt+1;bt+1
[ ln[ertkt   Akt kt+1   bt+1 + t +Rbtbt+
+(1   st)nswst estZst + (1  ut )nuwut eutZut ]  nsest   nueut+
+EtV (kt+1; bt+1; e
s
t+1; e
u
t+1)]:
(20)
The envelope condition for capital stock, kt is:
Vk (kt; bt; e
s
t ; e
u
t ) =
ert
ct
(21)
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and the rst order condition for kt+1 is:
EtVk
 
kt+1; bt+1; e
s
t+1; e
u
t+1

=
Akt
ct
(22)
which equates the discounted expected marginal benet to the marginal cost
of investment.
Finally, substituting the one-period lead of the envelope condition (21)
into the rst-order condition for capital (22) gives the consumption Euler:
Et


ctert+1
ct+1

= Akt (23)
which shows that the expected, discounted return on investing in capital
must equal its price. Note that the return is discounted using the stochastic
discount factor  ct
ct+1
. The envelope condition for government bonds, bt is:
Vb (kt; bt; e
s
t ; e
u
t ) =
Rbt
ct
(24)
and the rst order condition for bt+1 is:
EtVb
 
kt+1; bt+1; e
s
t+1; e
u
t+1

=
1
ct
. (25)
Substituting the one-period lead of the envelope condition (24) into the
rst-order condition for government bonds (25) gives the bonds Euler, which
has a similar interpretation as the Euler for capital:
Et
 

ct
 
1 + rbt+1

ct+1
!
= 1 (26)
The FOCs for the households problem are given by (16), (23) and (26).
These determine the paths for fct; kt+1; bt+1g1t=0 given exogenous variables
Akt ; 
i
t
	1
t=0
; policy variables

 kt ; 
s
t ; 
u
t
	1
t=0
; initial conditions, fk0; b0g; and
the paths for variables that are exogenous to the households problem, i.e.
those determined at the aggregate level,

t; rt; r
b
t ; e
i
t+1
	1
t=0
and by wage bar-
gaining, fwitg1t=0.
2.5 Firms
There is a representative rm which leases capital from the household and
employs skilled and unskilled workers to produce a single good, with the
objective of maximising prots.
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2.5.1 Problem
To hire workers, the rm needs to post vacancies one period before the jobs
are required. In particular, the evolution of the number of workers per skilled
type employed by the rm is given by the job transition function which links
the future number of lled jobs, lf;it+1, to the net hiring, q
i
tv
i
t, plus the current
stock of lled jobs, (1  it) lf;it :
lf;it+1 = q
i
tv
i
t +
 
1  it

lf;it : (27)
Given that posting vacancies is costly, the prot function of the rm is:
ft = y
f
t   rtkft   wst lf;st   (1   v;st )'svst   wut lf;ut   (1   v;ut )'uvut (28)
where 's; 'u > 0 stand for the constant resource costs of opening a new
skilled and unskilled vacancy respectively; and  v;it refer to the vacancy sub-
sidies.
The employment evolution equations in (27) imply that prot maximi-
sation is intertemporal, since expenditure on posting vacancies today will
increase prots tomorrow. Therefore, the objective of the rm at time pe-
riod t = 0 is to maximise the present value of its lifetime prots, which is
given by:
yf0   r0kf0   ws0lf;s0   (1   v;s0 )'svs0   wu0 lf;u0   (1   v;u0 )'uvu0+
+Et
1X
t=1
tY
i=1
er 1i fyft   rtkft   wst lf;st   (1   v;st )'svst   wut lf;ut  
  (1   v;ut )'uvut g
(29)
where yf0 and y
f
t are given by the CES production function in (1) at time 0
and t respectively.
Since prots are returned to the household, t + 1 returns are converted
to present value terms by the stochastic discount factor from the households
optimisation problem, (23). For i = s; u, the rm chooses
n
kft ; v
i
t; l
f;i
t+1
o1
t=0
to maximise (29) subject to (27) , taking factor prices fwit; rtg1t=0; matching
probabilities fqitg1t=0; exogenous job separation rates fitg1t=0; economic pol-
icy

 v;it
	1
t=0
; and initial conditions for flf;i0 g as given. The variable, At is
determined by the following stochastic process:
At+1 = (A)
1 A (At)
A e"
A
t+1 (30)
where A > 0; 0 < A < 1; and "
A
t+1  iidN

0; (A)
2.
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2.5.2 First-order conditions
The rms problem is written in recursive form as:
J

lf;st ; l
f;u
t

= max
kft ;v
s
t ;v
u
t
[yft   rtkft   wst lf;st   (1   v;st )'svst 
 wut lf;ut   (1   v;ut )'uvut ] + Eter 1t+1J(qst vst+
+(1  st) lf;st ; qut vut + (1  ut ) lf;ut )
(31)
where J(:) is the value function. The FOCs for kft , v
s
t and v
u
t are:
rt =
1

At



lf;ut

+ (1  )
h


kft

+ (1  )

lf;st
i 1 1
 (1  ) 

h


kft

+ (1  )

lf;st
i 1


kft
 1
 mplkt (32)
(1   v;st )'s = Eter 1t+1qstJlf;s lf;st+1; lf;ut+1 (33)
(1   v;ut )'u = Eter 1t+1qut Jlf;u lf;st+1; lf;ut+1 (34)
stating respectively that the marginal cost of capital is equal to its marginal
benet and that the marginal costs of creating skilled and unskilled vacancies
are equal to the expected return of hiring one additional skilled and unskilled
worker next period.
The envelope condition for skilled employment, lf;st is:
Jlf;s

lf;st ; l
f;u
t

= mplst   wst + (1  st)Eter 1t+1Jlf;s lf;st+1; lf;ut+1 (35)
where mplst = At



lf;ut

+ (1  )
h


kft

+ (1  )

lf;st
i 1 1
 (1  )
h


kft

+ (1  )

lf;st
i 1
(1  )

lf;st
 1
. After substituting
for the continuation value, er 1t+1Jlf;s lf;st+1; lf;ut+1, using the rst-order condition
for vst in (33) this condition becomes:
Jlf;s

lf;st ; l
f;u
t

= mplst   wst + (1  st)
's
qst
(1   v;st ) : (36)
Finally, to obtain the FOC for the rm, we rst lead (36) by one period
and substitute it into (33) to obtain:
(1   v;st )
's
qst
= Eter 1t+1 mplst+1   wst+1 +  1  st+1 'sqst+1  1   v;st+1

(37)
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Working, similarly for unskilled employment, we have:
(1   v;ut )
'u
qut
= Eter 1t+1 mplut+1   wut+1 +  1  ut+1 'uqut+1  1   v;ut+1

: (38)
where mplut = At



lf;ut

+ (1  )
h


kft

+ (1  )

lf;st
i 1 1


lf;ut
 1
. These conditions equate the marginal cost of posting a job va-
cancy to the expected discounted marginal benet for skilled and unskilled
jobs respectively. The benet is comprised of two elements. First, the in-
crease in prots associated with hiring an extra worker, mplut+1   wut+1, and
the saving associated with not having to post a job vacancy in the next
period,
 
1  ut+1

'u
qut+1
.
For i = s; u, the FOCs for the rms problem are given by (27), (28),
(32), (37) and (38), which determine the paths for
n
lf;it+1; 
f
t ; k
f
t ; v
i
t
o1
t=0
, given
exogenous processes, fAt; itg1t=0; variables that are determined at the aggre-
gate level, frt; qitg1t=0, or by wage bargaining fwitg1t=0; and initial conditions
for flf;i0 g.
2.6 Wage Bargaining
We assume that once a worker/household member is matched with a rm,
the household and the rm bargain over the wage rate. The equilibrium wage
is determined by a Nash bargain. In particular, the equilibrium wage rate
maximises the Nash product:heVei   ewitii h eJlf;i   ewiti1 i (39)
where i measures the power of the household/worker relative to the rm in
the Nash bargain; eVei ( ewit) is the value of a successful bargain at wage ewit for
the household and eJlf;i ( ewit) is the value of a successful bargain at wage ewit
for the rm.
2.6.1 Households valuation of employment
The valuation of the household for an additional member being employed at
wage wit is given by the envelope conditions of (20) for e
s
t and e
u
t respectively:
Ves (kt; bt; e
s
t ; e
u
t ) =
(1 st )nswstZst
ct
  ns + (1  st   pst)
EtVes
 
kt+1; bt+1; e
s
t+1; e
u
t+1
 (40)
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Veu (kt; bt; e
s
t ; e
u
t ) =
(1 ut )nuwut Zut
ct
  nu + (1  ut   put )
EtVeu
 
kt+1; bt+1; e
s
t+1; e
u
t+1

:
(41)
We next consider the marginal value to a household of allowing a small
number of its members, st > 0, to be paid an arbitrary wage, ewst , in period
t, assuming that the wage reverted to the equilibrium wage wst+1 from next
period. In these circumstances the value function of household in equation
(20) becomes:bV ( ewst ; st) = max
kt+1;bt+1
f ln ertkt   Akt kt+1   bt+1 + t +Rbtbt+
+(1   st)nswst estZst + (1   st)ns ewst stZst + (1  ut )nuwut eutZut ) 
 ns (est + st)  nueut g+ EtV fkt+1; bt+1; [pst (1  est   st)+
+ (1  st) (est + st)]; [put (1  eut ) + (1  ut ) eut ]g:
(42)
Di¤erentiating bV ( ewst ; st) with respect to st and evaluating the derivative
at st = 0 to derive the marginal value of a skilled worker employed at an
arbitrary wage, ewst :bVs ( ewst ; 0) = (1 st )ns ewstZstct   ns + (1  st   pst)EtVes  kt+1; bt+1; est+1; eut+1 : (43)
If we combine the expression for eVes ( ewst )  bVs ( ewst ; 0) with the envelope
condition for est in equation (40) we obtain:
eVes ( ewst ) = (1   st)nsct ( ewst   wst )Zst + Ves (kt; bt; est ; eut ) : (44)
Equivalently, we can derive the marginal value of an unskilled worker
employed at an arbitrary wage, ewut :
eVeu ( ewut ) = (1  ut )nuct ( ewut   wut )Zut + Veu (kt; bt; est ; eut ) : (45)
2.6.2 Firms valuation of employment
We work similarly to obtain the rms valuation of agreeing to employment at
a wage ewit. Assume that the rm pays a small fraction,  st > 0, of employed
workers an arbitrary wage ewst at time period t, and that the wage rate will
return to the equilibrium wage wst+1 from the next period. The value function
of rm, (31) can be modied to:
bJ ( ewst ;  st) = max
vst ;v
u
t
fyft   rtkft  

wst l
f;s
t + ewst st  (1   v;st )
'svst   wut lf;ut   (1   v;ut )'uvut + Eter 1t+1J([qst vst + (1  st)
(ls;ft +  st)]; [qut vut + (1  ut ) lf;ut ])g:
(46)
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We di¤erentiate bJ ( ewst ;  st) with respect to  st and evaluate it at  st = 0
to get the marginal prot of employing a skilled worker at ewst :
bJ s ( ewst ; 0) = Atf lf;ut  + (1  ) [kft  + (1  )


lf;st

]

 g 1 1 (1  )
h


kft

+ (1  )

lf;st
i 1
 (1  )

lf;st
 1
  ewst + (1  st)Eter 1t+1Jlf;s lf;st+1; lf;ut+1 :
(47)
We then combine this with the envelope condition for lf;st in (36) to get
the marginal prot of employing a skilled worker at an arbitrary wage, ewst ,
at time t, and the equilibrium wage thereafter:
eJlf;s ( ewst ) = wst   ewst + Jlf;s lf;st ; lf;ut  (48)
where eJlf;s ( ewst )  bJ s ( ewst ; 0).
Similarly, we can derive the respective condition for unskilled workers:
eJlf;u ( ewut ) = wut   ewut + Jlf;u lf;st ; lf;ut  : (49)
2.6.3 (Nash) equilibrium wage
The rst-order condition of the Nash bargain (39) with respect to ewst is:
0 = s
heVes ( ewst )is 1 h eJlf;s ( ewst )i1 s @ eVes ( ewst )@ ewst +
+(1  s)
heVes ( ewst )is h eJlf;st ( ewst )i s @ eJlf;st ( ewst )@ ewst : (50)
Substituting the derivatives of (44) and (48) with respect to ewst as well
as the expressions for eVes ( ewst ) and eJlf;s ( ewst ) from (44) and (48) respectively
into (50) and evaluating at wst = ewst gives:
s
(1   st)ns
ct
Jlf;s

lf;st ; l
f;u
t

Zst = (1  s)Ves (kt; bt; est ; eut ) : (51)
Working as described in detail in Appendix A, we can derive the wage
equations (A3) - (A4), which can alternatively be written as:
(1   st)Zstwst = sf(1   st)Zst
h
mplst + (1  st) '
s
qst
(1   v;st )
i
 
  (1  st   pst)Et
 
1   st+1

Zst+1A
k
t
's
qst
(1   v;st )g+ (1  s) ct:
(52)
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(1  ut )Zut wut = uf(1  ut )Zut
h
mplut + (1  ut ) '
u
qut
(1   v;ut )
i
 
  (1  ut   put )Et
 
1  ut+1

Zut+1A
k
t
'u
qut
(1   v;ut )g+ (1  u) ct
(53)
These equations are generalisations of wage equations under Nash bar-
gaining obtained in the literature (see e.g. Shimer (2010)). For i = s; u, the
return of an additional worker to the household is given by (1   it)Zitwit, i.e.
the after-tax e¤ective (or productivity-adjusted) wage. In equilibrium, this
is equal to a weighted average of the e¤ective marginal product of labour
under search and matching, i.e. (1   it)Zit
h
mplit + (1  it) '
i
qit
 
1   v;it
i  
(1  it   pit)Et
 
1   it+1

Zit+1A
k
t
'i
qit
 
1   v;it

, and the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between consumption and leisure, MRSi, i.e. ct, with the weights
given by the bargaining power of the worker. The MRSi follows the com-
mon denition of the ratio of the marginal utility of leisure, , over the mar-
ginal utility of consumption, 1=ct. The e¤ective marginal product of labour
measures the additional after-tax productivity-adjusted output generated by
moving a worker from unemployment to employment. It is comprised of
(i) the direct after-tax increase in output provided by an additional skilled
worker, mplit; (ii) the additional savings in terms of resources that would be
required to post a vacancy if the matched job survives, (1  it) '
i
qit
 
1   v;it

,
where (1  it) is the probability that a worker will remain in place in the
next period and '
i
qit
 
1   v;it

is the cost per job posting multiplied by the
duration that the job needs to be posted, 1
qit
;7 (iii) the increase in job-posting
costs for the rm implied by the decrease in future successful matches due to
the increase in employment, (1  it   pit)Et
 
1   it+1

Zit+1A
k
t
'i
qit
 
1   v;it

.
Note that an increase in current employment increases future unemployment
(and thus the requirement for the rm to post a vacancy to ll the lost
job) by @st+1
@et
= (1  it   pit), because there is reduction in the number of
workers who search for jobs. Furthermore, note that these costs need to be
discounted by the price of transferring resources between periods, Akt , which
equals, from (23), expected future returns to investment discounted by the
stochastic discount factor.
The above wage equations hold when there is no OJL and under purely
external OJL. If we employ the alternative OJL mechanism which inter-
nalises own employment on labour productivity, the right hand side of the
7Note that from (37) - (38), '
i
qit

1  v;it

is also equal to the expected benet to the
rm from posting a job.
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above equations respectively are multiplied by the term:24i +  1  i

Zit + e
i
t
@Zit
@eit

Zit
35 1 ; i = s; u
where @Z
s
t
@est
= s
s (est)
s 1 (eut )
1 s ; and @Z
u
t
@eut
= (1  u) 
u (est)
u
(eut ). These
extra terms: (i) collapse to unity under external OJL, i.e. when @Z
i
t
@eit
= 0;
(ii) are less than one,8 implying that internalising OJL creates a channel
that tends to reduce the Nash bargained wage, relative to the cases of no
or external OJL. When the workers internalise the e¤ect of employment on
their productivity and thus on their returns, they are willing to work for a
lower wage rate.
2.7 Government budget and market clearing
The government budget constraint is:
gt + 
v;s
t '
svst + 
v;u
t '
uvut +R
b
tbt =
= bt+1 + 
k
t (rt   ) kt +  stnswst estZst + ut nuwut eutZut (54)
where gt is the per-capita government consumption.
The capital markets clear when the supply is equal to the demand for
capital per capita:
kt = k
f
t : (55)
In the skilled and unskilled labour markets, the equality of per capita
labour supply and demand is given by:
nsestZ
s
t = l
f;s
t (56)
and
nueutZ
u
t = l
f;u
t : (57)
Moreover, dividends paid to the household must equal prots:
t = 
f
t : (58)
Finally, in the goods markets, the economys per capita resource con-
straint is satised:
yft = ct + A
k
t kt+1   Akt (1  ) kt + gt + 'svst + 'uvut : (59)
8To see this, rst note that eZ 

Zit+e
i
t
@Zit
@eit

Zit
> 1, since eit
@Zit
@eit
> 0. Then, note that
i +
 
1  i eZ > 1) i + eZ   i eZ   1 > 0) eZ   1  i  eZ   1 > 0) 1 > i, which is true. Hence, hi +  1  i eZi 1 < 1.
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2.8 Decentralized equilibrium
Given the paths of the exogenous variables

At; A
k
t ; 
s
t ; 
u
t
	1
t=0
and initial
conditions for fk0; b0; es0; eu0g, a decentralized equilibrium is dened as a series
of prices,

wst ; w
u
t ; rt; r
b
t
	1
t=0
, matching probabilities, fpst ; put ; qst ; qut g1t=0 and
allocations,
n
ct; t; kt+1; bt+1; e
s
t+1; e
u
t+1; 
f
t ; k
f
t ; v
s
t ; v
u
t ; l
f;s
t+1; l
f;u
t+1
o1
t=0
, such that
(i) households and rms undertake their respective optimization problems,
taking aggregate outcomes and economic policy as given, under search and
matching in the labour market as outlined above; (ii) wage rates for both
types of labour are determined by a Nash bargain for matched household
members and rms; (iii) all budget constraints are satised; and (iv) all
markets clear. Finally note that in equilibrium, we have est = e
s
t and e
u
t = e
u
t .
Using Walraslaw we drop the households budget constraint, so that the
DE consists of the following equations: (i) the search and vacancy matching
probabilities in (5) and (6); (ii) the consumption and bonds Euler equations
(23) and (26); (iii) the rms optimality conditions given by (27) for (i = s; u),
(28), (32), (37) and (38); (iv) the wage equations (A3) and (A4); and (v) the
market clearing conditions in (55), (56), (57), (58) and (59).9
3 Quantitative implementation
In the following section we rst discuss the model calibration followed by the
quantitative predictions of the model regarding the steady-state and near
steady-state dynamics. We consider three model variants, depending on the
assumptions we make regarding the labour productivity technology, as cap-
tured by Zit , for i = s; u. In particular, since we want to contextualise the
potential importance of OJL, we rst consider a benchmark case without it,
so that Zit = 

i = 1. We then choose 
i in the cases of OJL that we consider
(where the employment e¤ects are purely external, OJLx, and where the own
e¤ect is internalised, OJLn) so that the level of labour productivity in the
steady-state, Zi, is the same across all three model variants. This further
implies that the models without OJL and OJLx have identical steady-states,
whereas OJLn is re-calibrated following the same strategy as the other two
models so that its steady-state is e¤ectively the same.
9Note that when the market clearing conditions (56) and (57) and the matching prob-
abilities in equations (5) and (6) are imposed on the employment evolution equations (17)
and (27) the latter become identical. Hence, we drop the employment evolution equations
(17) from the households problem from the DE.
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3.1 Model Calibration
Table 1 reports the values for the structural parameters of the model based on
a quarterly calibration.10 The table indicates how each parameter is obtained
by referring to various sources. This includes calculations using: (i) the data;
(ii) estimates and assumptions from other studies in the literature; and (iii)
calibration to target steady-state values for the relevant endogenous variables
of the model. As explained above, these refer to the model variants without
and with purely external OJL. We summarise at the end is this sub-section
the changes in parameters required for the OJLn model.
Table 1: Model Parameters
Parameter Value Denition Source
0 < ns< 1 0.450 population share of skilled workers data
0   k< 1 0.360 tax rate on capital income estimate
0   s< 1 0.350 tax rate on skilled labour income estimate
0  u< 1 0.250 tax rate on unskilled labour income estimate
g > 0 0.425 per-capita government consumption calibration
0 <  < 1 0.990 time discount factor calibration
0    1 0.022 depreciation rate of capital stock calibration
1
1  0.669 capital to skilled labour elasticity estimate
1
1  1.669 capital to unskilled labour elasticity estimate
0 <  < 1 0.493 share of composite input to output calibration
0 <  < 1 0.820 share of capital to composite input calibration
 > 0 0.100 disutility cost of employment calibration
0 < s< 1 0.028 skilled job separation rate calibration
0 < u< 1 0.045 unskilled job separation rate calibration
0 < s< 1 0.600 elasticity of skilled search assumption
0 < u< 1 0.500 elasticity of unskilled search assumption
0 < s< 1 0.600 bargaining power of skilled workers assumption
0 < u< 1 0.500 bargaining power of unskilled workers assumption
's> 0 0.900 unit cost of posting skilled job calibration
'u> 0 0.820 unit cost of posting unskilled job calibration
0 <  v;s;  v;u< 1 0.010 job vacancy subsidy assumption
s> 0 0.800 skilled matching e¢ ciency calibration
u> 0 0.600 unskilled matching e¢ ciency calibration
0 < s; u < 1 0.500 elasticity of learning assumption
10Note that, where possible, we follow Shimer (2010, see Appendix A) in the choice of
time period (1959-2007). Note however, that the sectoral data employed below are only
available from 1992:1-2011:4.
20
3.1.1 Population shares, policy, discount and depreciation rates
We use data from Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for the period (1963-2008)
to calculate the population share of skilled workers, ns = 0:45. Consistent
with the range used in the literature, the time discount factor,  = 0:99,
is set to give an annual return to capital, net of depreciation, of about 4%.
Similarly the depreciation rate,  = 0:022, is calibrated to target a quarterly
steady-state capital to output ratio of about 8 which on an annual basis is
consistent with a ratio of around 2. Following Uhlig (2010) we set the tax
rate on capital income to 36%. Moreover, we choose the two labour income
tax rates to be  s = 35% and u = 25%, which imply a weighted average
close to the 28% labour income tax rate used in Uhlig (2010). The level of
government spending is set so that the debt to output ratio is 0:63 or in
quarterly terms 2:52 (as in Uhlig (2010)).
3.1.2 Production
The elasticities of substitution between skilled labour and capital and be-
tween unskilled labour and capital have been estimated by Krusell et al.
(2000). We use their estimates, so that  =  0:495 and  = 0:401. To
ensure the skill premium and labour share in income are consistent with the
data,  and  respectively are calibrated to 0:493 and 0:82 (see, e.g. Lindquist
(2004), He and Liu (2008), Pourpourides (2011) and He (2012) who use a
similar approach to calibrating the production function). The target value
for the skill premium of approximately 1:68 is obtained from Acemoglu and
Autor (2011) for the period (1963-2008). We measure the labour income
share using data from National Income and Product Accounts Table 1.10,
1959-2013, which gives a value of approximately 0.66. Finally, the parame-
ters capturing steady-state TFP and investment-specic technical change,
i.e. A and Ak are normalised to unity.
3.1.3 Utility function and job separation rates
Following Shimer (2010) we set the disutility of employment parameter,  =
0:1, to imply an aggregate unemployment rate of about 5%. Also note,
that Shimer (2005) reports that an average employment exit probability of
0:034. Given this and the assumption that skilled labour has a lower job
separation rate (see, e.g. Fallick and Fleischman (2004), Hagedorn et al.
(2010), and Pilossoph (2012)) we set the job separation rates, s = 0:028
and u = 0:045, to approximately match the sectoral unemployment rates of
21
3% and 7% respectively.11
3.1.4 New matches and bargaining power
The values used for the elasticities of new matches with respect to search
time, s = 0:6 and u = 0:5, are within the range of econometric evidence
reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). To ensure that the Hosios
(1990) condition is satised we set the relative bargaining power of worker in
the skilled and unskilled sectors respectively to s = 0:6 and u = 0:5 (see,
Cahuc et al. (2006) who nd that skilled workers have higher bargaining
power).
3.1.5 Job posting costs and subsidy
Pissarides (1994), Acemoglu (2001) and Krause and Lubik (2006 and 2010)
suggest that the ow cost of posting a vacancy is higher in good jobs.
Following these studies, we assume that the job posting for skilled is greater
than that for unskilled labour, i.e. 's > 'u. These parameters are calibrated
to ensure aggregate job costs as a share of GDP of about 2.5% which coheres
with Arseneau and Chugh (2012) and aggregate labour market tightness of
about unity which is the value used in Pissarides (1998) and Campolmi and
Gnocchi (2014). Also following Campolmi et al. (2011) we set the vacancy
subsidy rate to 1%.
3.1.6 Matching e¢ ciency and OJL
Consistent with an aggregate unemployment rate of 5% and an average em-
ployment exit probability of 0:034, Shimer (2010, see p. 67) implies a job
nding probability about 0:65. Following this approach for each labour mar-
ket gives us target probabilities of ps = 0:828 and put = 0:591 which we
obtain by calibrating s = 0:8 and u = 0:6. The nding probabilities
in turn imply unemployment durations of about 1:21 and 1:69 quarters for
skilled and unskilled respectively. The calibration also suggests that the job
lling rate is higher for the skilled versus the unskilled consistent with Krause
and Lubik (2006 and 2010). As explained above, we present the models re-
sults below both without and with learning. In the former, Zst = Z
u
t = 1
in (10-11). In both forms of latter (i.e. OJLx and OJLn) we set the ex-
ponents s = u = 0:5 and calibrate 
s and 
u so that in the steady-state
11The sectoral employment and unemployment data are from the monthly Labor Force
Statistics, Current Population Survey for period (1992:1-2011:4). It reports data for civil-
ian non-institutional population 25 years and over by educational attainment. Skilled
workers are those with a Bachelors degree and higher.
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the Z functions are equal to unity as under no learning. This requires that

s = 
u = 1:055.12
3.2 Steady-state
The steady-state implied by the above calibration is reported in Table 2 for
the models without and with purely external learning. These results show
that great ratios are well in line with the U.S. data. Moreover, the remaining
values cohere with the targets discussed in the calibration above. For the
third model variant, the results are quantitatively similar. To ensure that
the model under OJLn implies an analogous steady-state with the remaining
two model-variants, we re-calibrate  = 0:500, 's = 1:600, 'u = 1:520, and
g = 0:401, following the same calibration strategy outlined above. Note that
as discussed in Section 2.6.3, when workers internalise OJL, bargained wages
tend to be lower and thus unemployment lower. Therefore, to maintain the
same level of unemployment and labour market tightness in the steady-state,
job-posting costs need to increase.
Table 2: Steady-state
c
y
k
y
g
y
b
y
we
y
v
y
ss su s
0.571 8.198 0.225 2.520 0.660 0.024 0.033 0.071 0.054
ws
wu
er rb zs zu ps pu qs qu
1.680 0.010 0.010 1.089 0.971 0.828 0.591 0.760 0.609
3.3 Stochastic processes
When undertaking the model simulations we draw the four processes dis-
cussed above from a multivariate normal distribution, denoted x = N (x;; )
where x = ["At ; "
Ak
t ; "
gs
t ; "
gu
t ]; x is the vector of means and  is the variance-
covariance matrix of shocks. The parameters of stochastic processes driving
the model are reported in Table 3. The autocorrelation parameter of TFP
is set equal to 0.95, following Gertler and Trigari (2009), and Arseneau and
Chugh (2012). As in the literature, the volatility parameter, A, is cal-
ibrated to match the standard deviation of HP-ltered output, 0.011. Re-
12Given the lack of data for exponents in the learning functions, we experiment with
some alternative combinations. For example, we place more weight on the own-elasticity
for the skilled, i.e. s = 0:8 and (1   s) = 0:2 while at the same time keeping weight of
the own-elasticity for the unskilled: (i) the same, u = 0:5 and (1  u) = 0:5; (ii) higher,
u = 0:8 and (1  u) = 0:2; and (iii) lower, u = 0:2 and (1  u) = 0:8. We nd that the
results reported below, including steady-state, second-moments, impulse responses and
scal multipliers, are robust these to alternative parameterisations. This applies to both
the OJLx and OJLn setups.
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garding investment-specic technical change, we use the estimates from Pour-
pourides (2011), which implies setting Ak , to 0.6015 and Ak , to 0.0047.
Given the lack of sectoral data for the job separation rates, we apply the
same quarterly autocorrelation, s and u, and standard deviation, s
and u , parameters for skilled and unskilled using data from the Job Open-
ings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) for the period 2001Q1-2014Q2.
Finally, the correlation between job separation shocks, cor("g
s
t ; "
gu
t ), is cal-
ibrated to match the correlation between HP-ltered skilled and unskilled
employment/unemployment rates in the data.13
Table 3: Stochastic processes
Parameter Value Denition Source
A 0.008 SD of TFP calibration
A 0.950 AR(1) coe¢ cient of TFP assumption
Ak 0.0047 SD of IT estimate
Ak 0.6015 AR(1) coe¢ cient of IT estimate
s 0.073 SD of skilled separation rate data
s 0.740 AR(1) coef. of skilled separation rate data
u 0.073 SD of unskilled separation rate data
u 0.740 AR(1) coef. of unskilled separation rate data
cor("g
s
t ; "
gu
t ) 0.980 Job separation rate shock correlation calibration
3.4 Solution and second moments
Following Shimer (2010), we present results under shocks to TFP and the
job separation rates but we also consider investment-specic technological
change, given the importance attached to skill-biased technical change in ex-
plaining the behaviour of the skill premium in the literature. The results for
the sectoral variables discussed in the Introduction are presented in Table 4.
To obtain these results we rst solve a rst-order approximation of the dy-
namic system of equations characterising the DE around the steady-state, by
implementing the perturbation methods in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004).
We then simulate time paths under shocks to total factor productivity, the
job separation rates and investment-specic technological change, as indi-
cated. We conduct 10,000 simulations of 80 periods (i.e. 1992Q1-2011Q4)
to match the sectoral employment and unemployment data and 100 periods
(i.e. 1979Q1-2003Q4) to match the skill premium data, initialised from the
steady-state in Table 2. For each simulation, we HP-lter the logged se-
ries and then compute the required moments and report the means of these
13Note that not allowing for this correlation only a¤ects this target.
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moments across the simulations in Table 4.
Table 4: Second moments
Shocks to A, i Shocks to A, Ak, i
Data no OJL OJLx OJLn no OJL OJLx OJLn
(es; eu) 0.961 0.960 0.960 0.961 0.960 0.960 0.961
(es; y) 0.927 0.252 0.444 0.447 0.249 0.441 0.444
(eu; y) 0.931 0.264 0.459 0.462 0.261 0.456 0.459
(ws=wu; y) 0.086 0.078 -0.179 -0.217 0.073 -0.149 -0.168
(es)=(y) 0.327 0.248 0.225 0.228 0.248 0.224 0.228
(eu)=(y) 0.597 0.485 0.442 0.447 0.484 0.441 0.446
(ws=wu)=(y) 0.870 0.208 0.248 0.347 0.256 0.283 0.433
As can be seen in Table 4, all three model variants predict sectoral labour
market quantities that have qualitatively similar cyclical properties with the
data. In particular, the model predicts positive correlations between output
and employment (although not so strong as in the data) and a very low
correlation between output and the skill premium. It is notable that the
output correlations of employment are very low without OJL, but increase
and are qualitatively closer to the data under OJL. Furthermore, the models
predict a standard deviation for de-trended skill premium and output that
is lower than that of output, consistent with the data. Quantitatively, the
volatility of the skill premium is improved when shocks to Ak are included
in the set of exogenous processes.
All models under-predict, quantitatively, the volatility of employment
in the two sectors, which is expected given the results in Shimer (2005 and
2010). However, the predicted volatility of employment in the sectoral model
is signicantly improved compared with the canonical one-sector model. In
particular, the model variants predict an employment volatility which ranges
from 69% to 81% of the volatility of employment in the data, whereas in the
canonical models in e.g. Shimer (2010), this ratio is typically about 25%.14
Moreover, the models do capture a key property of sectoral employment, in
particular that unskilled employment is nearly twice as volatile as skilled
employment.
These model-generated second moments match the characteristics of sec-
toral employment and wage inequality that were discussed in the Introduc-
tion. The results in Table 4 further suggest that it is not easy to distin-
guish the model variants based on their ability to t the sectoral second
moments. While qualitatively they are all similar, each model has relative
14Shimer (2010, p. 95) describes standard deviations of employment relative to output
of a magnitude of about 45%, to "nally generate interesting uctuations in employment".
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successes compared with the others. However, the models with OJL are
clearly preferable to the model that does not allow for OJL regarding the
output correlations for employment. Therefore, to analyse the e¤ect of pol-
icy below we present results for all three model variants. This allows us to
provide a range for the likely size of the scal multipliers arising from tar-
geted labour market interventions and thus to quantitatively evaluate the
importance of OJL or skill erosion for the e¤ects of policy interventions.
4 Fiscal interventions in the labour market
We next consider the e¤ect of targeted labour market policies in the form
of job-posting subsidies and income tax cuts.15 In particular, we focus the
following policy experiments. First, that the government increases  v;st tem-
porarily by one percentage point and lets government debt absorb the scal
implications of the shock. Second, we examine the e¤ects of a similar in-
crease in  v;st under xed government debt, so that the policy intervention
is nanced by a proportional increase in the labour and capital income tax
rates.16 This budgetary restriction is particularly relevant given the current,
post nancial crisis economic reality that severely limits the use of debt to
nance scal interventions in most advanced economies. We then repeat the
same experiments for an increase in  v;ut by one percentage point. Finally, we
discuss the implications of labour market interventions in the form of cuts in
the labour income taxes by one-percentage point.17 To implement the above
experiments, we assume that when temporarily shocked, vacancy subsidies
and income taxes follow standard AR(1) processes.18
We rst discuss the impulse responses of the rst policy experiment in
detail, to analyse the channels via which vacancy subsidies a¤ect employment
in the two sectors and output. We focus on the two models that have the
same calibration and steady-state, i.e. without OJL and under OJLx, since
15See Campolimi et al. (2011) and Faia et al. (2013) who conduct similar analysis in
the context of a search and matching model with endogenous participation and a labour
selection model with turnover costs and Nash bargained wages, respectively.
16In this case, we x the level of government debt to its steady-state level, let one of the
income taxes to be the residual policy instrument in the government budget constraint,
and x the remaining two income taxes to remain in the same proportion with the residual
income tax as in the steady-state.
17Note that normalising the tax cuts to have the same scal implications as the vacancy
subsidy interventions yields e¤ectively the same results.
18Following Campolmi et al. (2011) we set the AR(1) parameters for the vacancy subsi-
dies to 0.90 and following Angelopoulos et al. we set the AR(1) parameters on the skilled
and unskilled income taxes to 0.950 and 0.920.
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the e¤ects are directly comparable, and thus we can trace the workings of
the OJL mechanism following the policy intervention. We then summarise
the implications for output and unemployment in each case by calculating
the scal multipliers for the remaining labour market interventions that we
consider. Following Leeper et al. (2009) we calculate scal multipliers as
follows:
FMk =
kP
j=0

jQ
i=0
R 1t+i

yt+j
kP
j=0

jQ
i=0
R 1t+i

xt+j
(60)
where Rt  1 + (1   kt )(rt   ); yt = (yt   y) and xt = (xt   x). For the
vacancy subsidy multipliersxt = e v;it  e v;i, where i = s; u and e v;it = 'ivit v;it
gives the cost of the subsidy. Finally for the tax multipliers xt = e it   e i,
where e it = ni itwiteit (without OJL) and e it = ni itwiteitZit (under OJLx and
OJLn) represent the respective costs of the tax reduction.
4.1 Impulse responses to  v;st
In Figure 2 we present the impulse response functions of a temporary in-
crease in  v;st by one percentage point under exible debt. The main results
from an increase in the subsidy to the vacancy posting costs for skilled work-
ers is that employment for skilled workers increases along with their wages
and the skill premium, while, at the aggregate level, investment and output
increase. However, the magnitudes of these aggregate e¤ects depend on the
assumptions regarding on-the-job learning, which is also critical in determin-
ing the e¤ects of this policy on aggregate consumption and the unskilled
labour market.
[Figure 2 here]
An increase in  v;st implies that the cost for posting skilled vacancies is re-
duced, so that the number of vacancies, vst , increases and employment follows.
These e¤ects are quantitatively very similar for all model variants irrespective
of OJL, since job posting decisions of the rm are not directly a¤ected by
OJL. Wages increase for skilled workers when employment increases, since
the workers can bargain for a share of the higher expected rm prots from a
successful match under reduced unemployment. Note that both pst and 1=q
s
t
increase when unemployment is reduced (and/or vacancies increase), so that
from (52) wst increases.
The rise in employment crowds in investment and consumption (at least
after some periods withoutOJL) for two reasons. First, the marginal product
of capital, mplk, has increased, since it is a positive function of employment
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and this tends to increase investment. Second, the income of the household
has increased, because of higher employment and wages of skilled, as well
as higher prots of the rm. In turn, the increased employment and capital
increase output. Under OJL, consumption, investment and output increase
by more, because the rise in employment has a direct productivity e¤ect on
production (and thus the marginal product of capital, output, and household
income). Without OJL, the household income gains are not strong enough
initially to allow the household to increase both consumption and invest-
ment, so that it is optimal to reduce consumption to increase investment
temporarily.
Increases in skilled job posting vacancies also have an e¤ect on the un-
skilled labour market. The increase in est increases the marginal product
of unskilled labour, mplu, which tends to increase labour demand and va-
cancy postings for unskilled jobs. However, under OJL, there are additional
e¤ects. In particular, since est increases the e¤ective quantity of unskilled
labour (by increasing Zut ), this tends to decrease mpl
u, which is decreasing
in the e¤ective quantity of unskilled labour. Therefore, under OJL, there is
a channel that tends to mediate the positive e¤ects of  v;st on the unskilled
labour market, so that the nal e¤ect of  v;st on e
u
t is bigger without OJL.
The unskilled wage increases because mplu has risen. Relative to the e¤ects
of  v;st on w
s
t , the positive e¤ects of 
v;s
t on w
u
t are second order and thus w
u
t
rises by less, so that the skill premium increases.
4.2 Fiscal multipliers
We next present and discuss the scal multipliers for the di¤erent scal in-
terventions in the labour markets.
4.2.1 Skilled vacancy subsidy
The scal multipliers associated with the increase in the subsidy for post-
ing skilled jobs are shown in the rst row of Figure 3. As can be seen, the
unemployment multipliers are negative and the output multipliers are posi-
tive. As expected, given the previous analysis and the impulse responses of
employment and output, the FMs: (i) are e¤ectively the same without and
with OJLx for skilled unemployment; (ii) are signicantly smaller for un-
skilled unemployment; and (iii) vary signicantly between the cases without
and with OJLx for output. The magnitude of the skilled unemployment FM
reported here is similar to e.g. the unemployment multipliers reported in
Monacelli et al. (2010). However, OJLx introduces a channel that translates
standard employment e¤ects to big output multipliers. As explained above,
28
in this case the increase in employment crowds in signicant investment, as
the increase in labour productivity raises the marginal product of capital, as
well as household income, to high levels. In fact, under OJLx the output
multiplier is greater than one.
[Figure 3 here]
We then repeat the policy intervention of the increase in the subsidy for
posting skilled jobs, this time working with the xed debt restriction, so that
the scal implications of the increased expenditure are met by increases in
income taxation. The scal multipliers in this case are reported in the second
row on Figure 3. As can be seen, the size of the multipliers is e¤ectively unaf-
fected, suggesting that this type of labour market intervention is potentially
very useful in an environment where the ability of the government to use
public debt to boost the economy is restricted. Since the scal implications
of the vacancy subsidy are relatively small, the size of the multipliers is pre-
dominantly driven by the change in the target quantities in the numerators
of (60), for which the e¤ect of the vacancy subsidy is direct and dominates
the side-e¤ects arising from modest increases in income taxation.
4.2.2 Unskilled vacancy subsidy
Working as above, we obtain the scal multipliers for the increase in the sub-
sidy for posting unskilled jobs. These are shown in Figure 4, under exible
and xed debt. The e¤ects are generally similar to those under vacancy sub-
sidies to skilled workers, obviously with the main employment e¤ect in this
case being in the unskilled labour market. There are some notable di¤erences
between increases in  v;st and 
v;u
t . First, the size of the unemployment and
output multipliers are bigger for  v;ut , because the unskilled labour market is
characterised by higher unemployment, so that the corrective potential for
government policy is stronger. Second, the cross-unemployment e¤ect for the
 v;ut intervention is positive under OJL
x, although still relatively small com-
pared with the e¤ect on the unemployment of the labour market where the
policy is applied. The previous analyses shows that the cross-unemployment
e¤ect under OJLx is less favourable because in this case the cross marginal
product of labour is negatively a¤ected by the increase in labour productivity
of the labour input in the other sector via the OJL channel. In this case,
this additional negative e¤ect dominates, so that employment in skill jobs is
reduced after an increase in  v;ut .
[Figure 4 here]
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4.2.3 Vacancy subsidies under OLJn
In Figure 5, we report the scal multipliers for the increase in the subsidies
for posting skilled and unskilled jobs, under exible and xed debt, when
OJL is internalised by the workers. The results are broadly similar to those
obtained under OLJx (compare with Figures 3 and 4 above) and thus the
multipliers are bigger compared with a labour market withoutOJL, given the
positive spill-over e¤ects of OJL. Quantitatively, the size of the output and
own-employment multipliers is smaller under OLJn, compared with OLJx.
When the labour productivity e¤ects of employment are internalised in the
Nash bargain, the workers bargain for a bigger rise in their wage, so that
they extract a higher share of the rms prots, which in turn leads to lower
increases in investment. As a result, the employment and output multipliers
are smaller. Moreover, the above channel also implies that positive spillover
e¤ects on the marginal product of labour and employment for the other
worker-type are lower, so that cross-unemployment is increased, although
again by a small amount.
[Figure 5 here]
4.2.4 Income tax cuts
Finally, we considered one-percentage point cuts in the labour income taxes.
While positive, the scal multipliers associated with these interventions are
signicantly smaller compared with the vacancy subsidies. The change in
vacancy subsidies, as explained above, is a supply-side e¤ect that works via
the rm side, by reducing the cost of creating jobs. Therefore, the employ-
ment e¤ects are driven by the creation of new jobs. On the other hand, a
reduction in income taxes works via the workers evaluation of opportunity
costs and benets under employment, and thus a¤ects outcomes via the Nash
bargained wage rate. In particular, it lowers the wage rate as a result of Nash
bargaining, given that the opportunity cost to work (and thus the outside
option) is reduced and this increases employment. Therefore, while vacancy
subsidies a¤ect employment directly, by reducing a market friction, income
taxes a¤ect unemployment indirectly, by working via the distorted labour
market, i.e. Nash bargaining, which implies that part of the benets are lost.
To illustrate these e¤ects, we plot, in Figure 6, the FMs for a reduction in  st
and ut .
[Figure 6 here]
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5 Conclusions
This paper evaluated the e¤ects of policy interventions on sectoral labour
markets and the aggregate economy in a business cycle model with search and
matching frictions. We extended the canonical model by including capital-
skill complementarity in production, skilled and unskilled labour markets and
on-the-job-learning (OJL) within and across skill types. Our policy analysis
evaluated the e¤ects of temporary interventions in the labour markets and the
aggregate economy. We found scal multipliers on output from the subsides
to skilled and unskilled vacancies, which were greater than unity when OJL
was external and near unity when it was internal. These large multipliers
were determined by the crowding-in of private investment, which followed the
increases in employment and labour productivity. Without OJL, the labour
productivity channel was absent and caused the output multipliers to fall to
about 0.6. In contrast to the vacancy subsidies, the positive output e¤ects
from cutting skilled and unskilled income taxes were near zero,irrespective
of the presence, or model, of OJL. We nally found that the e¤ects of the
two vacancy subsidies did not depend on whether debt or distorting taxes
were used to nance them. This is particularly good news, and suggests that
this type of intervention may be useful under the debt restrictions that many
governments now face in the wake of the nancial crisis.
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Appendix A: Derivation of Wage Equations
Using (51) and its one-period lead to eliminate Ves (kt; est ; e
u
t ) and Ves(kt+1;
est+1; e
u
t+1) in the envelope condition for skilled employment (40) yields an
expression whose both sides are multiplied by ct (1  s) and divided by ns
to give:
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Multiplying Et ctct+1 by
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using (35) and Jlf;s
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in (A1) using the Euler (23) yields:
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Simplifying the resulting expression gives the Nash wage rate for skilled
workers:
wst = 
sfmplst + [1  st   (1  st   pst) (A3)
EtAkt
 
Zst+1
 
1   st+1

Zst (1   st)
!
]
's
qst
(1   v;st )g+
 (1  s) ct
(1   st)Zst
:
Working similarly, we can derive the Nash wage rate for unskilled workers:
wut = 
ufmplut + [1  ut   (1  ut   put ) (A4)
EtAkt
 
Zut+1
 
1  ut+1

Zut (1  ut )
!
]
'u
qut
(1   v;ut )g+
 (1  u) ct
(1  ut )Zut
:
Alternatively, the wage equations that result from Nash bargaining can
be written as in (52)-(53) of the main text.
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Figure 1: Stylised facts
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Figure 2: Impulse responses for a temporary 1% point rise in τv,s
t
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Figure 3: Fiscal multipliers for a temporary 1% point rise in τv,s
t
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Figure 4: Fiscal multipliers for a temporary 1% point rise in τv,u
t
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Figure 5: Fiscal multipliers (OJLn model) for a temporary 1% point rise in τv,i
t
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Figure 6: Fiscal multipliers for a temporary 1% point fall in τs
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